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Abstract
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, commonly referred to as the “Volcker Rule”, essentially prohibits
“banking entities” from engaging in “proprietary trading” and from acquiring or
retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships
with a hedge fund or a private equity fund. The rule has been controversial not
only because of its substantive content but also due to its extraterritorial reach,
which has a significant impact on foreign banking entities that have U.S.
affiliates. The Volcker Rule’s extraterritoriality lies within the broad definition of
the term “banking entity”, which includes not only insured depository institutions
and U.S. bank holding companies, but also non-U.S. banks which have a U.S.
branch or agency and any affiliate of the foregoing on a world-wide basis, whether
or not they are organized or located in the United States.
The application of U.S. regulations to entities operating abroad merely
because the entities happen to have a U.S. branch is contradictory to the principles
of international law. The principles of international law are based on the idea of
the sovereignty of nations and territorial application of the law. Yet, in light of the
context in which the Volcker Rule was enacted—a crisis which required immediate
global regulation of proprietary trading—it was probably the most efficient
measure at a moment where other foreign regulators were moving slower and did
not show any specific intention to regulate the matter. However, in the quest
towards efficiency—and in consideration of the potential for inconsistent
regulation among different countries—financial regulators around the world
should work towards a uniform and transparent approach that would, ideally, be
acceptable by all concerned parties.
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I. Introduction
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the “Volcker Rule”)1 is often characterized as one of the most
controversial provisions of the Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”).2 Essentially,
the Volcker Rule prohibits “banking entities”3 from engaging in “proprietary
trading”4 and from acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or
having certain relationships with a “hedge fund or a private equity fund” 5
(“Covered Funds”).6 The controversy surrounding the Volcker Rule pertains not
only to the substantive content of the Rule, but also to its extraterritorial reach.
The Volcker Rule’s extraterritoriality has been actively challenged by foreign
commentators.7 The concept of extraterritoriality refers to the applicability of a
sovereign’s laws outside of its territory. With regard to the Volcker Rule, this
1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124
Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)) (introducing a new section 13 to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956); see also Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.
(2011).
2. See, e.g., Stacy Goto Grant, International Financial Regulation Through G20: The Proprietary
Trading Case Study, 45 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1217, 1248 (2014).
3. The term “banking entity” is defined in section 1851(h)(1) as follows:
any insured depository institution (as defined in section 1813 of [Title 12], any company
that controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company
for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) (2012).
4. The concept of “proprietary trading” is defined in § 1851(h)(4) as follows:
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or nonbank financial
company supervised by the Board [of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] in any
transaction to purchase or sell . . . any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or
any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission may, by rule . . . determine.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2012).
5. The terms “hedge fund” and “private equity fund” are defined in §1851(h)(2) as follows:
an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 80a3(c)(1), (7)], or similar funds as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule,
as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2) (2012).
6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012). Under the Final Rule, the concept of Covered Funds includes (i) a
fund “that would be an investment company . . . but for Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the [Investment Company
Act of 1940];” (ii) a commodity pool the participation units of which are owned by qualified eligible persons
(i.e., institutional investors or high-net worth individuals); and (iii) with respect to only U.S. banking entities,
a non-U.S. private fund “organized and established outside the United States and the ownership interests of
which are offered or sold solely outside the United States.” See SEC, Final Rule: Prohibitions and Restrictions
on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Fund, SEC Release No. BHCA-1, 987–88 (2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/bhca-1.pdf
[hereinafter SEC Release No. BHCA-1].
7. Generally, commenters expressed concerns “that proprietary trading restrictions will have
detrimental impacts on the economy such as: reduction in efficiency of markets, economic growth, and in
employment due to a loss in liquidity.” See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 10.
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refers to the applicability of the Rule outside the territory of the United States.
The initial drafters of the Volcker Rule envisioned a broad extraterritorial
application of the Rule with a limited scope of exemptions available to foreign
entities.8 In the process of the rulemaking, the extraterritorial reach of the Rule
became somewhat more limited, to the extent that, under the final agency rules
implementing the Volcker Rule (the “Final Rule”),9 foreign banks are allowed to
benefit from some of the exceptions under less stringent conditions (see Section
III.A.1.). However, the Volcker Rule remains a regulation with clear
extraterritorial applicability (see Section II.B. and Section III.A.1.).
This Article comments on the evolution of the extraterritorial effects of the
Volcker Rule, beginning with its initial conception and following with a discussion
on the principle of extraterritoriality as adopted in the Final Rule. Part II
discusses the background behind the Volcker Rule and to what the Rule applies.
Part III will examine the legitimacy of the Final Rule’s extraterritorial application.
Further, Part III will address the efficiency of the Volcker Rule’s ability to meet
the regulators’ objective of global financial stability. Part IV will examine potential
alternatives for achieving the goals via other regulatory solutions. This Article
proposes that these alternatives to the Volcker Rule would be internationally
recognized and implemented with less controversy. Part V will conclude.
In light of the context in which the Volcker Rule was enacted—a crisis which
required immediate global regulation of proprietary trading—it was probably the
most efficient measure at a moment where other foreign regulators were moving
slower and did not show any specific intention to regulate the matter. However, in
the quest towards efficiency, and in consideration of the potential for inconsistent
regulation among different countries, financial regulators around the world should
work towards a uniform and transparent approach that would, ideally, be
acceptable by all concerned parties. The need for a consistent approach on a global
level has been recognized both by academics specializing in the field of
international financial regulation and by the financial regulation industry.10 Such
a consistent approach will avoid criticism such as the one provoked by the Volcker
Rule—the extraterritorial reach of certain U.S. national reforms may result in
burdensome overlap of regimes and be inconsistent with longstanding principles
of deference to the Home country supervisor.11
8. For instance, with respect to the exception available to foreign banks that trade “solely outside of the
United States”, the Proposed Rule listed four conditions for a transaction to be considered as having occurred
solely outside of the United States. Two of the conditions were (1) “[n]o party to the transaction is a resident
of the United States”, and (2) “[t]he transaction is executed wholly outside of the United States.” See SEC,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, SEC Release No. 34-65545, 136–38 (2011), available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-65545.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-65545]. These
conditions eliminated the possibility for a foreign bank to use the exception if it transacted with U.S.
counterparties or if the transaction took place on a U.S. exchange.
9. See generally SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6. The drafters of the Final Rule are the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”)
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”), collectively the “Competent Regulators”. See
id. at i.
10. See i.e., GEORGES UGEUX, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY xxvii (2014).
11. For a general comment on the effects of the extraterritorial financial regulation and the concept of
“substitute compliance” (deference to the Home country supervisor), see generally John C. Coffee Jr.,
Symposium on Extraterritoriality: Essay: Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home ,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2014).
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II. Background
A. Context of the Enactment of the Volcker Rule
Historically, the securities activities of commercial banks have been the
target of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (“Glass-Steagall”).12 Glass-Steagall was a
reaction to another major crisis, the banking crisis of 1929–33, commonly referred
to as the “Great Depression”. Glass-Steagall’s main contribution was the
separation of commercial banking and investment banking.13 However, by the
time the financial crisis of 2008 hit the global economy, financial institutions were
operating under a more liberal regime. The so called “Glass-Steagall Wall”,
existing between commercial banking and investment banking, was officially
eliminated in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.14 As a result, banks could
affiliate through specially qualified bank holding companies, known as “financial
holding companies”, with companies engaged in a full range of financial
activities.15 Thus, banking institutions were once again permitted to engage,
through their affiliates, in speculative activities.
Moreover, prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, commercial banks
were participating in the financial marketplace by engaging in another speculative
activity—proprietary trading. Banks were buying, holding, and selling securities
for their own account “in the expectation of profits from changes in market
prices.”16 Like other investors seeking high returns on supposedly safe products,
banks were purchasing mortgage-backed securities. It is now a well-known fact
that large banks suffered spectacular trading losses during the financial crisis of
2008.17 Once again, the need for controlling the risk undertaken by commercial
banks became apparent. This time, the relevant legislation (the Volcker Rule)
targeted different activities (proprietary trading and relationships with certain
funds), but its rationale is reminiscent of previous legislative concerns: separating
the commercial banking from risky speculative activities.
In his comment letter addressing the initial draft of regulation
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Proposed Rule”), Paul Volcker reemphasizes the logic behind the Act and comments on the necessity of
understanding the philosophy and purpose of the implementing regulations. He
highlights the basic public policy set out by the Act as follows: “the continuing
explicit and implicit support by the Federal government of commercial banking
organizations can be justified only to the extent those institutions provide
essential financial services.”18 In Paul Volcker’s opinion, proprietary trading “does
not justify the taxpayer subsidy implicit in routine access to Federal Reserve
credit, deposit insurance and emergency support.”19 More importantly,
12.
13.

See generally Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 114-38, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
See generally RICHARD CARNELL, JONATHAN MACEY, & GEOFFREY MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 17–18 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the historical context of Glass-Steagall’s enactment).
14. The Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act is also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
See generally Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
15. See CARNELL, MACEY, & MILLER, supra note 13, at 27.
16. See Paul A. Volcker, Commentary on the Restrictions on Proprietary Trading by Insured Depository
Institutions 2 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-182.pdf.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id.
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Paul Volcker blames proprietary trading for contributing to the financial crisis of
2008 by jeopardizing the stability of important banks who had suffered losses as
a result of such speculative activities.20
B. Scope of the Volcker Rule
The Volcker Rule generally prohibits banking entities from engaging in
proprietary trading and from investing in and sponsoring certain hedge funds and
private equity funds (referred to in Part I as Covered Funds) subject to a number
of exceptions.21 Some of the exceptions include underwriting and market-making
related activities, trading by a non-U.S. bank in the sovereign obligations of its
Home country, trading on behalf of customers, and trading by a non-U.S. banking
entity that is conducted “solely outside of the United States” (the “SOTUS
Exception”).22
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[i]t is a ‘longstanding principle of
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” 23
Thus, American law recognizes the principle that in the absence of clear
Congressional intent to give the legislative act an extraterritorial application, the
act is presumed to apply domestically.24 In the Dodd-Frank Act, a clear
Congressional intent exists to address certain regulatory issues as a global
concern. The Volcker Rule is an example of Congressional intent. The Volcker
Rule’s extraterritoriality lies in the broad definition of the term “banking entity”,
which “includes . . . insured depository institutions25, U.S. bank holding
companies, non-U.S. banks with a U.S. branch or agency, and any affiliates of the
foregoing around the globe, whether or not they are organized or located in the
United States.”26 By purposefully including a broad definition of banking entities
to cover non-U.S. banks with a U.S. branch or agency and any affiliate of such
entity, the Rule clearly demonstrates Congress’s intent to reach beyond the
borders of the United States.
III. Discussion
A. Volcker Rule’s Extraterritorial Application to Non-U.S. Entities
The Volcker Rule grants to international banking organizations
headquartered outside of the United States some flexibility to engage in certain
activities falling within the scope of available exemptions as discussed herein.
However, these institutions are still required to invest efforts into the
implementation of organizational arrangements, such as specific compliance
20. Id. at 20.
21. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 986 et seq.
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1).
23. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
24. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (2010).
26. Robin Maxwell & Jacques Schillaci, The Final Volcker Rule and Its Extraterritorial Consequences
for Non-U.S. Banks, LINKLATERS 3 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/USPublications/Pages/Final-Volcker-Rule-Extraterritorial-Consequences-Non-US-Banks.aspx.
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programs, designed to make sure that the conditions of the applicable exemption
are met and the entity is not engaged in a prohibited activity.
The Final Rule and its subsequent interpretative guidance set forth the
precise scope of the Volcker Rule’s extraterritorial application. To appreciate the
importance of the extraterritoriality of the Volcker Rule, it is necessary to observe
the content of the Final Rule in comparison with the initial proposal for regulation
(the “Proposed Rule”).27 The Proposed Rule was released for comment more than
two years prior to the adoption of the Final Rule and was the subject of numerous
critiques that were mainly directed against its expansive extraterritorial reach. 28
With an apparent intent to promote competitive parity between U.S. and non-U.S.
banking organizations, the Proposed Rule introduced an expansive approach to
extraterritoriality and a restrictive reading of the statutory exemptions for
non-U.S. trading and funds activities.

1. The Proprietary Trading Ban and Available Exemptions
a. The “SOTUS” Exception
The statutory text defines “permitted activity” as any proprietary trading
that occurs “solely outside of the United States” (commonly referred to as the
“SOTUS Exception”), provided that the entity which conducts the trading “is not
directly or indirectly controlled by a [U.S.] banking entity.” 29 The Proposed Rule
had adopted a restrictive approach towards this exception, taking the position that
the exemption should not apply if the trading involved a U.S. counterparty30 or
occurred on a U.S. exchange or trading facility. 31 The Final Rule is less restrictive
to the extent that it permits a foreign bank to benefit from the SOTUS Exception
even when it uses U.S. infrastructure and/or transacts with certain U.S. entities
so long as the transaction took place “solely outside of the United States”. 32 More
specifically, a foreign banking entity will not be subject to the proprietary trading
ban if it satisfies the following conditions: “(i) the [non-U.S.] banking entity
engaging as principle in the purchase or sale (including any personnel . . . that
arrange, negotiate or execute such purchase or sale) is not located in the United
States . . .; (ii) the decision to purchase or sell” is made outside of the United States;
“(iii) the purchase or sale . . . is not accounted for as principal directly or on a
consolidated basis by any branch or affiliate that is located in . . . or organized
under the laws of the United States . . . ; (iv) no financing . . . is provided, directly
or indirectly, by any branch or affiliate located in . . . or organized under the laws
of the United States . . . ; and (v) the purchase or sale is not conducted with or
through any U.S. entity,” subject to several exceptions.33 These exceptions make
27. See generally SEC Release No. 34-65545, supra note 8.
28. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 440–52.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012).
30. SEC Release No. 34-65545, supra note 8, at 136. The Proposed Rule required that “[n]o party to the
purchase or sale [be] a resident of the United States”. Id. The term “resident of the United States” was defined
in a broader manner than in Regulation S, but in the Final Rule, the Competent Regulators decided to define
the term via reference to Regulation S. SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 1021.
31. Proposed Rule §_.6(d)(3)(iv) provides that “[t]he purchase or sale [be] executed wholly outside of the
United States.” See SEC Release No. 34-65545, supra note 8, at 410.
32. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 453 et seq.
33. Id. at 454–55.
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possible transactions with the following U.S. entities: (i) “the foreign operations of
a U.S. entity”, provided “no personnel . . . located in the United States are involved
in the arrangement, negotiation or execution of such purchase or sale”; (ii) “an
unaffiliated market intermediary acting as principal, provided the [transaction] is
promptly cleared and settled through a clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization”; and (iii) “an unaffiliated market intermediary” acting as agent,
“provided [the transaction] is conducted anonymously . . . on an exchange or
similar trading facility and promptly cleared and settled through a clearing agency
or derivatives clearing organization.”34
As the Competent Regulators explain, the purpose of the conditions is to
“ensure[s] that the risk, decision-making, arrangement, negotiation, execution
and financing of the [trading] activity resides outside the United States and limits
the risk to the U.S. financial system from trades by foreign banking entities with
or through U.S. entities.”35 At the same time, the drafters of the Final Rule took
into consideration some of the risks outlined by the commenters of the Proposed
Rule. For instance, the Final Rule addresses some of the concerns with respect to
the competitiveness of the U.S. trading platforms, which would suffer if foreign
banks were completely forbidden from using them for their proprietary trading
activity, since there would have been a considerable “relocation of these activities
that supports the financial stability and efficiency of U.S. markets.” 36 Moreover,
the Final Rule allows foreign banks to transact with some U.S. entities under
specific circumstances, which not only allows foreign banks more flexibility under
the exemption but also improves the competitiveness of the U.S. entities permitted
to engage in the transactions.37 Despite the relatively enlarged scope of the
SOTUS Exception, as Professor J. Coffee, Jr. observes, “the Volcker Rule
effectively does apply extraterritorially because at a minimum it requires banks
with U.S. branches to undertake significant compliance obligations to assure that
their trading stays well outside the United States.” 38
b. Other Available Exceptions
Further, other exceptions are also available to foreign banks such as the
general (i.e., applicable to all entities) exceptions for market-making and
underwriting.39 However, these exceptions require more burdensome compliance
programs due to the granular focus on the activities and position limits imposed
at the “trading desk” level of organization (“defined as the smallest discrete
trading unit of the bank”).40
Thus, even though a foreign banking entity with a presence in the United
States may be able to operate under one of the available exemptions, it must still
consider the Volcker Rule’s ban on proprietary trading. The foreign banking entity
may not be subject to the ban itself, but since it is subject to the Volcker Rule, it

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 455.
Id. at 455–56.
Id. at 449.
See id. at 455.
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 11, at 1289.

12 U.S.C. 1851 (d)(B).
Maxwell & Schillaci, supra note 26, at 5; see SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 966–67.
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needs to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the specific
conditions of the exemptions.

2. The Covered Funds Ban and Available Exemptions
A foreign banking entity with a branch or subsidiary in the United States
has to make sure it does not cross the limits of the permissible investing in and/or
sponsoring of the so-called “Covered Funds”.41 However, it benefits from
considerable flexibility, in comparison with its U.S. counterparties, since it is
permitted, for instance, to invest in non-U.S. private funds “organized or
established outside of the United States and the ownership interests of which are
offered or sold solely outside of the United States” (“Foreign Private Funds”).42 A
foreign banking entity is permitted to have such investment activity even though
it does not meet all requirements of the SOTUS Exception. At the same time, a
U.S. banking entity is not able to invest in the same funds. Foreign Private Funds
are exempt from the definition of Covered Funds only with respect to foreign
banks.43 Alternatively, foreign banks can benefit from a specific SOTUS Exception
for investment activity in Covered Funds (“Covered Funds SOTUS Exception”). 44
The impact of this exception is relatively limited considering the availability of the
Foreign Private Funds rule, but can still have some utility “for investments (i) in
U.S. organized funds and (ii) hedge funds or other vehicles engaged in proprietary
trading activities.”45 The Covered Funds SOTUS Exception has similar conditions
for situs of the activity “solely outside of the United States” as the proprietary
trading SOTUS Exception, in addition to the requirement that the offering of
interests in the Covered Fund must not “target” residents of the United States.46
B. The Volcker Rule’s Extraterritorial Application to U.S. Entities
The extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule to the foreign operations
of U.S. entities is an issue that was subject to vigorous discussion after the
publication of the Proposed Rule. However, commentators have made less progress
towards a relaxation of the rule.
The Competent Regulators considered the effect of the Volcker Rule’s
restrictions on the competitiveness of a U.S. banking entity outside of the United
States.47 They recognized the fact that the possibility to effectively compete “often
improves the potential for these [entities] to succeed and be profitable, and
thereby, often improves the safety and soundness of the entity and financial

41. Under the Final Rule, the concept of Covered Funds includes (i) a fund that would be an investment
company but for Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, (ii) a commodity pool the
participation units of which are owned by qualified eligible persons (institutional investors; high-net worth
individuals), and (iii) with respect to U.S. banking entities only, a non-U.S. private fund “organized and
established outside of the United States and the ownership interest of which are offered or sold outside of the
United States.” See Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 987–97.
42. See id. at 521–22, 988.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1019–20.
45. See Maxwell & Schillaci, supra note 26, at 10.
46. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 1019 et seq.
47. See id. at 456.
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stability in the United States.”48 However, the Competent Regulators refused to
go against the Congressional intent “to generally prohibit U.S. banking entities
(including their subsidiaries and branches) from engaging in proprietary
trading.”49 Thus, they refused to allow U.S. banks to conduct, through their
subsidiaries and branches located outside of the Unites States, the activity which
they were prohibited from conducting through their U.S. operations.50 Such
authorization would have subjected the U.S. banking entities and the U.S.
economy to the very risk which Congress attempted to avoid. Consequently, the
Final Rule confirms that the SOTUS Exception is available only if the banking
entity is not organized under, or controlled by an entity organized under, the laws
of the United States.51
Similarly, as mentioned above, a U.S. banking entity is given less freedom
to invest in or sponsor Covered Funds. It does not benefit from the exception
available for foreign banking entities to invest in foreign funds.52 Even if the fund
is foreign and the investment takes place outside of the United States, it is still
considered a “Covered Fund” with respect to U.S. banking entities. 53
This extraterritorial reach with respect to U.S. entities operating abroad
has been explained with the Volcker Rule’s objective to ensure the “safety and
soundness” of U.S. entities and the stability of the U.S. economic system. 54 A closer
look at the Volcker Rule’s rationale can shed light upon the reason for such broad
extraterritorial application.
C. Rationale and Legitimacy of the Volcker Rule’s Extraterritorial Reach
The Volcker Rule’s underlying rationale, as expressed by the former Federal
Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, is that the scope of any implicit federal guarantee
shall be limited to a relatively small number of important banking institutions
and to core banking activities, rather than extend across the spectrum of financial
intermediaries and risky activities.55 As to the Final Rule, its drafters are clearly
preoccupied with concerns regarding the “safety and soundness” of banking
institutions and the financial stability of United States as a whole.56 This concern
is, in fact, a fundamental consideration that Congress used to guide the Competent
Regulators in their drafting of the Final Rule.57
The safety and soundness of banking institutions and the financial stability
are universal concerns that have been addressed in other parts of the world.
However, the approaches used by foreign regulators were not necessarily identical
to the approach used by the Volcker Rule. For instance, the European Union has

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 457.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 522, 988.
53. See id. at 522, 988.
54. See id. at 465.
55. See VIRAL V. ACHARYQ, REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE
OF GLOBAL FINANCE 198 (Wiley 2011).
56. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 6, at 465.
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(J) (2012).

Vol. 4, Fall 2016

9

Global Markets Law Journal
also considered separating commercial banking from more speculative activities. 58
However, Europe has been traditionally attached to the concept of universal
banking and therefore has been less enthusiastic about breaking from this
model.59 Moreover, Europe (but also other regions of the world such as some Asian
countries) has been particularly sensitive to the extraterritorial reach of American
regulations; in particular, the Volcker Rule. The extensive extraterritorial
approach of the Proposed Rule met clear opposition. The European Commissioner
for Internal Market and Services, Michel Barnier, participated in actions against
the Proposed Rule, stating that it was not “acceptable that U.S. rules have such a
wide effect on other nations.”60
The domination of the United States in the global regulatory process and
the extraterritorial reach of some of the U.S. regulations have even led
commentators to ask whether the global financial regulation will not become “Lex
America”.61 It is true that applying U.S. regulations to entities operating abroad
merely because they happen to have a U.S. branch is in contradiction with the
principles of international private law, which are based upon the idea of the
sovereignty of nations and territorial application of the law. Under such
international private law approach, a European country will require a local branch
of a U.S. bank to respect its rules but will not impose regulations to the U.S. bank
regarding the U.S. activities simply because the U.S. bank has a local European
branch.
Although such an extraterritorial application of U.S. regulation may be
controversial, the United States was the first country to propose a regulatory
solution addressing the causes of the global financial crisis.62 Considering the
consequences of the crisis, no one can deny that adequate regulation was
indispensable. At the time the effects of the Volcker Rule were discussed before
the Senate and the House of Representatives, the United States was the only
nation to have taken any action to fundamentally reform the financial sector, and
more particularly, to separate commercial banking from riskier activities. 63 As
Lael Brainard, former Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs,
58. This was the subject matter of the Liikanen Report, issued by a high-level expert group on structural
banking reforms established by Commissioner Michel Barnier in February 2012; the group was chaired by
Erkki Liikanen. See generally ERKKI LIIKANEN ET AL., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE
STRUCTURE
OF
THE
EU
BANKING
SECTOR
(Brussels
Oct.
2,
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_ group/report_en.pdf; see also EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON STRUCTURAL
MEASURES IMPROVING THE RESILIENCE OF EU CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (Jan. 29, 2014), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:520 14PC0043&from=EN (under review pursuant to
EU legislative procedure).
59. For a discussion on the universal banking model and the different approaches in terms of reforms,
see UGEUX, supra note 10, at 89 et seq.
60. See Yalman Onaran, Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-23/banks-lobbied-to-widen-volcker-rule-beforeinciting-foreigners-against-law.
61. UGEUX, supra note 10, at xx.
62. As a comparison, the U.K. Vickers’ Report dates from 2011 and the Liikanen Report dates from 2012.
See generally LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 58; see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 58; see also INDEP.
COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS (Apr. 2011), available at http://s3eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf.
63. As a comparison, the U.K. Vickers’ Report dates from 2011 and the Liikanen Report dates from 2012.
See generally LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 58; see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 58; see also INDEP.
COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS (Apr. 2011), available at http://s3eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf.
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stated before the Senate at a Hearing dealing with the international
harmonization of the Wall Street reform, “[t]he expectation was that by moving
fast with a comprehensive set of reforms, the United States will lead from a
position of strength and others will enact reforms consistent with the U.S. one.” 64
Some initiatives did indeed follow the U.S. actions in other parts of the
world, such as the U.K.’s Vickers’ Report65 which includes proposals that big banks
shall be required to ring-fence66 certain riskier operations from their consumer
businesses. For example, the Liikanen Report on a European Union Level led to
the adoption of a proposal for regulation that allows banks to provide hedging
services to non-bank clients within a ring-fenced banking entity but requires
speculative trading and “any assets or derivative portions incurred in the process
of market-making” to be separated in a distinct trading entity. 67 France introduced
reforms on a national level, similarly using the ring-fencing concept rather than
resorting to a ban on proprietary trading.68 However, these initiatives
demonstrate that, although the different countries are preoccupied with similar
concerns, their regulation differs in the means of achieving the common goals.
Such divergence inevitably shows that arriving at a uniform solution will prove to
be a difficult task. As a practical matter, divergence also results in unjustified
burden for financial firms with global operations. Such firms risk becoming subject
to overlapping rules, requiring them to monitor their compliance with multiple
restrictions.
These initiatives were undertaken a couple of years after the Dodd-Frank
Act. In a context of inertia of foreign financial regulators and apparent difficulty
to arrive at a common approach, the Volcker Rule can be seen as a justified
impulse for a structural reform of the causes having led to the global financial
crisis. Moreover, it shall be acknowledged that the Final Rule (as compared to the
Proposed Rule) adopts an approach that is less questionable from an international
private law perspective, to the extent that, in its view, the United States regulates
its own banks, even when they act abroad, but oversees foreign banks when they
are acting on the U.S. territory, and thus “rests on a combination of inherent
sovereignty and territorialism.” 69
However, no matter how the approach may be justified in the particular
circumstances, a financial regulation on any aspect, led by a single country, will
continue, as a general matter, to be opposed by other countries. At the same time,
a consensus among all implicated parties on the issue of separating commercial
banking from speculative activities in particular, and on the issue of global
financial regulation in general, seems to be an unachievable task.
64. International harmonization of Wall Street reform: Orderly Liquidation, Derivatives, and the
Volcker Rule: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 39 (Mar. 22, 2012).
65. See INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, supra note 62.
66. See id. at 76. For a general discussion on ring-fencing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S.

CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013). In this context, ring-fencing means that banks will be required to take deposits through
a subsidiary which is a legal entity different from the legal entities that engage in riskier activities such as
trading.
67. See Grant, supra note 2, at 1257.
68. “LOI n° 2013-672 du 26 juillet 2013 de séparation et de régulation des activités bancaires” (French
law relating to the separation and regulation of banking activities), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027754539; see Grant, supra note 2, at
1258–59 (commenting on the aforementioned regulation).
69. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 11, at 1290.
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The divergent approaches on a single issue, exposed above, are the proof. In such
case, is there a solution for finding a consistent and transparent way to regulate
the problems of the financial industry that have become intrinsically global?
IV. Towards a Uniform Regulation of Global Financial Concerns
As Chairman Johnson, former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
stated “[a]mong the many lessons apparent from the recent financial crisis is that
the financial system is truly global and that risks and regulations in one country
can have significant effects on institutions and markets worldwide.”70
Consequently, the need for global financial regulation has reaffirmed itself with a
new force since the financial crisis in 2008. As to the possible solutions, however,
there is much less of a consensus among professionals, academics, and
commentators. While most agree that soft-law norms issued by various
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Financial
Stability Board (FSB), are insufficient to efficiently address global concerns due to
their non-binding nature,71 there are divergent views as to the way to achieve such
efficient global regulation. One of the solutions, advanced by Professor John
Coffee, Jr., is to achieve consistency through “minilateral” negotiation (i.e.,
negotiation between a small number of nations); for instance, the United States
and the European Union, as representative of its Member States, thus avoiding
the difficulty of reaching consensus typical for multilateral negotiations.72 Others
see the G20 as a body having the necessary legitimacy of directing the BCBS and
FSB to draft “an international accord that will ring-fence retail banking operations
from speculative proprietary trading and simultaneously impose higher capital
and quantitative limits on non-bank systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) that choose to engage in proprietary trading.”73 Yet others suggest a multipillar approach, including macro-prudential supervisor whose duties would be
assigned to a “revamped IMF” and a micro-prudential supervisor, whose role
would be assumed by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 74 These
proposals, among others, are centered on the idea of international cooperation
either through (i) an international body with the necessary legitimacy to impose
binding norms and supervise firms with cross-border activities; or (ii) negotiations
among several leading financially developed countries. Unfortunately, the idea of
such international cooperation, although absolutely necessary, may face the
problems exposed above: difficulty of reaching consensus, lack of legitimacy of
institutions to impose binding norms, and refusal by some countries to be
burdened by regulation from other countries or institutions. The United States
itself is not necessarily receptive to the imposition of norms by international
70. International Harmonization of Wall Street Reform: Orderly Liquidation, Derivatives, and the
Volcker Rule: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs , 112th Cong. (Mar. 22, 2012)

(opening statement of Chairman Johnson).
71. See, i.e., Coffee Jr., supra note 11, at 1298.
72. Id. at 1265–66.
73. See Grant, supra note 2, at 1260.
74. See EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 432–33 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012).
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standard-setting bodies. For instance, in another context, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was overtly opposed to IOSCO’s “Suitability
Requirement with Respect to the Distribution of Complex Financial Products”
report, published in January 2013.75
To avoid the problem of countries’ refusal to cooperate in order to ascertain
their sovereignty, one solution is to create another form of international
cooperation through voluntary adherence by global financial entities (such as
banking conglomerates) to a kind of self-regulatory authority. Such form of
public-private partnership, in which banks are members of a self-regulatory
authority subject to regulation may avoid the problem of a lack of legitimacy and
difficulty in reaching consensus. Of course, such authority cannot exist completely
independently. It has to be overseen by a more powerful institution. It could be
imagined that the G20 sets its agenda as a general matter and broadly oversees
its activity. A serious difficulty will be to incentivize big banks to voluntarily
submit themselves to regulation. A possible way to resolve this issue is to make
the adherence to the authority a reputational concern such as the banks that join,
by signing the charter of cooperation that would be created by the authority, could
market themselves as safer institutions.
The creation of such authority, although a challenging task, may become
the solution for a transparent, consistent, and efficient regulation of global
financial concerns, and will simultaneously avoid the controversy surrounding the
extraterritorial effects of national regulation such as the Volcker Rule. Although
based on the idea of self-regulation, such authority will need, at least in the initial
stage of its creation, the sponsorship of financially developed countries, such as
the United States. To achieve such uniform and internationally recognized
solution, the United States, as well as other leading economies, should abandon
their extraterritorially applicable rules, and rather focus their resources on
contributing to a common international arrangement. By sponsoring such an
arrangement, the United States, and other strong economies, will be able to
maintain their leading position in the global financial market and advance their
understanding of efficient financial regulation in a less controversial manner.
Although created with the active help of major financial forces, the international
arrangement will not be imposed by a single country and neither will it rely on
complete consensus among countries. It will be developed through incentivizing
global private actors to participate in the quest for the appropriate solution, and
thus it could receive broader acceptance.
Finally, it is important to note that financially developed countries, such as
the United States, will be able to maintain their dominant positions in this
public-private regulatory arrangement, because of the strong positions private
actors in such countries hold on the financial market. This could only make this
solution all the more viable and politically acceptable while safeguarding the
territorial principles of international law.

75. See UGEUX, supra note 3, at 45 (discussing the SEC’s position).
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V. Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2008 has reaffirmed the need to monitor global
financial regulation and to control the risky activities of major financial
institutions, whose operations affect the global economy. Proprietary trading is
one such activity and the United States put into place a solution to regulate it both
domestically and, in certain aspects, extraterritorially, through the Volcker Rule.
However, a regulation imposed globally by one or even several countries would
naturally meet the opposition of other sovereigns attached to the idea that they
are the ones to determine the laws applicable to their territory. Thus, to avoid the
controversy surrounding laws with extraterritorial application, an alternative
approach to global regulation should be sought. One possible alternative solution
is to incentivize global financial institutions to adhere to a self-regulatory regime,
based on collaboration between regulated institutions and regulatory bodies, and
sponsorship by major financially developed countries.
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